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Abstract
This paper shows that private information may be crucial in explaining the relationship be-
tween liquidity, investment and economic ￿ uctuations. First, it de￿nes liquidity in a way that
is clearly connected to investment and output. Second, it models economies where privately
informed entrepreneurs issue debt to fund their investment opportunities and identi￿es a the-
oretically based, empirically usable, and macroeconomic relevant measure of liquidity of the
economy: the cross-￿rm dispersion in debt yields. Finally, it rationalizes one novel stylized fact
regarding the US corporate bond market: the positive relationship between the proposed meaure
of liquidity - the cross-￿rm dispersion in the "yields to maturity" on newly issued publicly traded
debt - and subsequent aggregate economic activity.
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During ￿nancial and economic crises, such as the very recent one, there are frequent concerns
regarding the level of liquidity available to the corporate sector. In practise, though, it is di¢ cult
to assess the severity of these concerns because it is not obvious what is a macroeconomically
meaningful notion of liquidity and how it could be measured. We address this issue in three steps.
First, we propose a de￿nition of liquidity that is clearly connected to investment and output and,
therefore, is useful to macroeconomics. Second, we present an empirical measure of liquidity that
is consistent with this de￿nition. Finally, we show that the predictions of our model regarding the
relationship between liquidity and economic ￿ uctuations are consistent with U.S. data and help
rationalizing some not previously observed stylized facts.
Liquidity is de￿ned here as the ease of translating the future values of assets into current market
prices.1 This is not a trivial issue because, when ￿rms issue securities to fund their investment,
they generally have private information regarding the quality of the opportunities at hand.2 We
show that this simple informational friction may be responsible for the illiquidity of the economy,
formally de￿ned by the fact that available securities are mispriced, i.e. their prices di⁄er from
the discounted value of the payments they entail. The mispricing of securities used to ￿nance
investment is important since it causes misallocation of resources and suboptimal equilibria in the
real economy.
A recent and active area of research, starting with the works of Kiyotaki and Moore (2001a,
2001b), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001, 2002) and Krishnamurthy (2003), has delivered in-
sightful ￿ndings on the relationship between liquidity and investment in economies with exogenously
given illiquid assets. The key theoretical contribution of our paper to this growing literature is to
show that the mispricing that characterizes the lack of liquidity in the economy is an equilibrium
result and should not be implicitly assumed. In particular, we argue that the securities used to
1This de￿nition follows most closely Eisfeldt (2004) and Holmstrom and Tirole (2001): "liquidity [...] does not
[only] refer to the ease with which assets can be resold, but rather to [...] the value of ￿nancial instruments used to
transport wealth across time [...]."
2Johnson (2004) stresses that the ￿nance literature highlights at least three distinct sources for (il)liquidity:
search costs, inventory risks and asymmetric information. Here, following an established macroeconomic tradition
(Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001) (2002), Krishnamurthy (2003)) I focus on private
information.
1￿nance investment, and assets in general, are not liquid or illiquid per se but their liquidity is
determined in equilibrium by the optimizing behavior of ￿rms, which respond to the presence of
asymmetric information and the state of economic fundamentals. Lack of liquidity is therefore an
equilibrium result that may￿ not must￿ appear. We then elicit the interesting implications that
can be derived by studying how the liquidity of assets results from the change in entrepreneur￿ s
optimizing behavior in front of shifting economic fundamentals.
By viewing the liquidity of assets as an equilibrium outcome, we propose a setup with the clear
advantage of linking together liquidity, investment and economic ￿ uctuations. Focusing on the
relationship between liquidity in the corporate bond market and aggregate ￿ uctuations, our model
predicts that liquidity, investment, and the variance of leverage decisions across ￿rms should all be
positively correlated with economic growth. We then compare these theoretical predictions with
data regarding the US corporate bond market and, consistently with the model￿ s set up, we interpret
the cross-￿rm dispersion in the prices￿ "yields to maturity"￿ of newly issued publicly traded debt
as a measure of liquidity. With our theoretical framework in mind, we highlight a novel stylized
fact in the US corporate bond market: the positive relationship between the cross-￿rm dispersion
in the "yields to maturity" on newly issued publicly traded debt - i.e. liquidity in our perspective
- and subsequent aggregate economic activity. This observation contributes to the literature not
only because it provides an empirically usable and macroeconomically relevant measure of liquidity,
but also because it observes and rationalizes a novel correlation between aggregate variables in the
US economy.
Going in more details, we consider economies where entrepreneurs ￿nance their investment by
issuing bonds, subject to the possibility of default. There are two distinctive features of this set
of economies. The ￿rst is that entrepreneurs have private information about the productivity of
the investment opportunity at hand. The second is that entrepreneurs choose how many bonds
they issue, i.e. their leverage, hence selecting the size of their investment and the probability and
extent of default on their bonds.3 This matches what happens in the real world where ￿rms actively
manage their leverage, as Leland and Pyle (1977) and Myers and Majluf (1984) pointed out in a
related context.
3This study does not explictly model ￿nancial intermediation by banks. The analysis could be easily applied to
loan contracts.
2Consumers lend funds to entrepreneurs by purchasing bonds in competitive markets but they
can only distinguish one ￿rm from the other on the basis of its leverage, i.e. the number of bonds a
￿rm issues. Capital markets are consistently organized so that all bonds issued by ￿rms undertaking
the same leverage decision are traded in the same "market". The price of a given bond thus re￿ ects
the information consumers extract in equilibrium about the mix of good and bad entrepreneurs
undertaking that speci￿c leverage level. Entrepreneurs simultaneously decide how many bonds
they issue, comparing the bond price with their expected payments across di⁄erent leverage levels.
In the absence of informational asymmetry, high productivity entrepreneurs have a higher return
on their investment and so their size is also larger than low productivity entrepreneurs. When
asymmetric information is introduced, productive entrepreneurs react by distorting their leverage
decision in an attempt to signal their quality to consumers. In order to distinguish themselves, high
productivity entrepreneurs increase their leverage, raising the number of bonds they issue. Low
quality entrepreneurs then face the crucial trade-o⁄. They can decide to mimic the leverage decision
of better quality entrepreneurs so that their bonds will be overpriced (positive price e⁄ect), but
they also bear the cost of distorting their leverage decision (negative leverage e⁄ect) and increasing
their probability of default. Otherwise, they may decide to go their separate way, avoid to distort
their leverage and receive a fair price for their bonds. This trade-o⁄ is at the basis of the type of
equilibrium￿ pooling or separating￿ that may emerge in the bond market of this economy.
Our main theoretical contribution is to show that this trade-o⁄ endogenously shifts making the
type of equilibrium depend on aggregate productivity. We ￿nd that, when the state of aggregate
productivity is low so that the probability that investment opportunities succeed falls, illiquid
pooling equilibria emerge. The intuition is that good and bad technologies are very di⁄erent
during bad times because the realization of the bad contingency is relatively worse for the volatile
technology of worse entrepreneurs. Thus the "price e⁄ect" is stronger than the "leverage e⁄ect"
pushing low quality entrepreneurs to mimic better entrepreneurs and, thus, all entrepreneurs issue
the same number of bonds. The economy is illiquid in a pooling equilibrium because, although bonds
are correctly priced on average, each of them is individually mispriced, i.e. it has a price that di⁄ers
from the discounted value of its future payments. In fact, better entrepreneurs ￿nd it relatively
more di¢ cult to borrow funds: bonds issued by high (low) quality entrepreneurs are underpriced
3(overpriced). This generates a misallocation of investment that lowers aggregate production. Lack
of liquidity is interpreted here not only as the fact that good investment opportunities face hard
terms when applying for credit, but also as the fact that credit providers have a hard time in
identifying the most worthy projects and so funds are diverted towards less productive investment.
This interpretation of liquidity is economically meaningful and already present in the literature
(Eisfeldt (2004) and Kurlat (2009)).
In contrast, when the economy picks up, liquid separating equilibria arise. When the probability
that investment opportunities succeed increases, the "distance" between high and low productivity
entrepreneurs reduces. Therefore, the subsidization in bonds￿prices￿ the price e⁄ect￿ becomes less
attractive for low quality entrepreneurs. As the state of the economy improves, these entrepreneurs
prefer to abandon the pooling equilibrium to avoid the distortion in their leverage decision. When
entrepreneurs with di⁄erent technologies issue di⁄erent amounts of bonds and undertake di⁄erent
leverage decisions, the separating equilibrium that appears in the bond market restores liquidity:
private information is fully revealed and consumers identify the quality of each bond￿ i.e. its
expected delivery￿ simply by observing leverage decisions. Therefore, bond prices re￿ ect the
actual present value of future payments for each bond.
The fact that liquidity is procyclical in this setup may seem counterintuitive: it appears nat-
ural to argue that, when the economic outlook turns grim, high quality ￿rms will want to avoid
the additional liquidity cost connected with subsidizing low quality bonds in the pooling equilib-
rium. This intuition, however, is not correct if one accepts the crucial trade-o⁄ stressed here: it is
the relatively stronger incentive of bad quality entrepreneurs to mimic better entrepreneurs when
productivity is low to determine the failure of the good entrepreneur￿ s signalling e⁄ort.
In order to obtain this novel result we overcome a well known problem in the literature on
adverse selection. There is a general consensus that, for economies with asymmetric information,
pooling equilibria are either not existent or di¢ cult to sustain because they are sensitive to agents￿
beliefs about o⁄-equilibrium. This would be a problem in the present context because pooling
equilibria are central to the analysis of liquidity. We show that under fairly general conditions,
illiquid pooling equilibria are indeed robust to optimistic o⁄-equilibrium expectations, provided
that bonds￿payments are positively related to the productivity of the underlying ￿rm as it is
4assumed here. By adapting to the framework of a production economy the de￿nition of equilibrium
in Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003), we show that, di⁄erently from Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003)
and Martin (2008), also pooling equilibria, and thus illiquidity, are robust.4
The model has one main prediction that ￿nd supporting evidence in the US bond market.
The theory predicts that when the economy faces poor economic prospects, an illiquid pooling
equilibrium emerges. In this equilibrium, ￿rms undertake similar leverages and so the prices of
bonds￿ the yields￿ issued by di⁄erent entrepreneurs converge. I identify cross-￿rm bond yields
dispersion as the measure of the economy-wide liquidity: the smaller the dispersion, the less liquid
is the economy. When the economy accelerates and a liquid separating equilibrium arises, ￿rms
instead di⁄erentiate themselves by undertaking di⁄erent leverages, and bond yields diverge accord-
ingly, showing an improvement in the economy-wide liquidity. Thus the theory predicts that the
cross sectional variance in bond yields issued by di⁄erent ￿rms in a given quarter￿ the proposed
measure of economy-wide liquidity- should increase in anticipation of an improvement in economic
activity.
Our paper also contributes to the line of research that links asymmetric information to the
notion of liquidity and relates most closely to Eisfeldt (2004) and, more recently, Kurlat (2009).
It di⁄ers from these works because it highlights the role of endogeneity of ￿nancial contracts and
leverage decisions in establishing a relationship between liquidity and economic ￿ uctuations and
providing an observable measure of liquidity that can be employed in future empirical analysis.5
In a seminal contribution, Eisfeldt (2004) ￿nds that, as the productivity of technology changes
along the business cycle, entrepreneurs have the incentive to raise more funds when productivity
is higher. Entrepreneurs ￿nance their new investment by selling claims over the future production
of projects previously initiated. When the economy faces a high productivity shock, the most
productive entrepreneurs tend to sell relatively more claims than the owners of worse technologies.
Therefore, when the economy faces a higher productivity shock, the quality of the average traded
claim increases, the market price increases and this is interpreted as an increase in liquidity to the
corporate sector. This explanation relies on the restriction that we relax in this paper: entrepreneurs
4Please see Martin (2008) and section 3 for deatils on this issue.
5See, for instance, Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) and Farhi, Golosov, and Tsyvinski (2008) regarding other empirical
measures of liquidity.
5face a security space made up of only one "contract". They can not use their leverage decision￿ the
choice of how many securities they issue￿ to signal their private information because this choice
can not be observed by ￿nancial traders by assumption. This assumption seems both theoretically
and empirically questionable as Demarzo and Du¢ e (1999) and Demarzo (2003) pointed out in
the context of security design. Although the relaxation of this restriction delivers substantial
complications, we address these complications in this paper and their solution enables us to derive
a novel and well de￿ned empirical measure of liquidity, as well as a prediction that seems to ￿nd
support in the context of US corporate debt market.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 lays out the setup and equilibrium de￿nition.
Sections 3 discusses the equilibrium in economies with symmetric information. Section 4 studies
the economies with informational asymmetry while section 5 presents the empirical regularity in
the US bond market consistent with the predictions of the model. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Economy: Setup
In the discussion that follows the reader may refer to the following ￿gure:














Time: the economy lasts two periods:  = 12. Two contingencies,  2  = fg can be
realized at  = 2 with probabilities ￿ = Pr();
6Commodity Space: there is a single perishable consumption/investment good in each period.
Let 
 () denote the amount consumed by agent  at time  in state ;
Agents and Endowment: there is a continuum of consumers  uniformly distributed on the
interval [0]   1. Consumers are endowed with   0 units of the consumption good at  = 1
only There is also measure 1 of entrepreneurs endowed with investment technology  = fg
distributed according to:
￿ = (￿ ()￿ () = 1 ¬ ￿ ())
1  ￿ ()  0
and no consumption good endowment.
Preferences: in order to abstract from risk, all agents in the economy have identical linear
preferences:
 [] = 1 + [￿ ￿ 2() + (1 ¬ ￿) ￿ 2()] (1)
Technology: there are 2 types of investment opportunities, labeled by  = fg where 
() stands for high (low) productivity. They are available at  = 1 and produce stochastic output





 2 fg 2 fg
(0) = 0 0 ()  0 00 ()  0
lim
¬!0
0 () = +1
(2)
The production function is neoclassical,  labels the units of consumption good invested in tech-



























so that "" is clearly the better technology since it gives higher expected production with no




Perfect positive correlation (i.e. aggregate uncertainty) in technologies￿payo⁄s is assumed.
This is equivalent to an economy with two aggregate states but where each investment opportunity
is subject to a technology-speci￿c state contingent shock.7
Bond Market: there are many ￿nancial contracts, each generated by the entrepreneur￿ s choice
of how many bonds she issues. Each ￿nancial contract is therefore characterized by a vector 
 of
state contingent payments to bondholders, 
(), which depends on the number of bonds issued,
, and the quality of the technology in the issuing ￿rm, . With a little abuse in the de￿nition - but
for the sake of simplicity, I will often refer to the ￿nancial contract corresponding to the issuance












The payment vector of a security depends on the default decision of the issuing entrepreneur.
Given the chosen security , the entrepreneur decides whether to default and surrender part of his




, net of the 0     1 share she can conceal, or to honor her initial
promise and pay 1 unit of the consumption good per issued bond. Default is thus strategic in this
setup. The assumption that, after default, entrepreneurs can conceal a share of the ￿rm value to
creditors is standard and seems realistic. I do not need to assume that this share is large as long
as it is di⁄erent from zero.
Moreover, it is important to stress why focusing on the bond market in general, and corpo-
rate debt in particular is appropriate. First, bonds are the largely predominant part of external
￿nancing. Bolton and Scharfstein (1996) report that, from 1946 to 1987, 85 percent of total U.S.
￿rms external ￿nancing was raised through debt o⁄erings. Second, this assumption is theoretically
consistent with the present model: it can be easily shown that bonds (or bank loans for all that
matter) are in fact the optimal credit contract here. Adding equity contracts would not change any
of the qualitative results of this paper.
6In order for the arguments in the paper to go through, it is only required that the best technology has higher
expected production and smaller variance. The speci￿c structure assumed here is for espositional simplicity only.
7This assumption simpli￿es notation and is made without loss of generality.
8Finally observe that, since better technologies default less often - for given number of issued
bonds-, equation (4) implies that the security￿ s expected payment is an increasing function of the
technology￿ s productivity/quality. This is equivalent to assuming that more productive ￿rms issue
more valuable securities on average and, at the same time, that the payment linked to a security
depends on the economic performance of a ￿rm - its production here. These realistic assumptions
will play a central role in establishing a relation between economic ￿ uctuations and liquidity.
Information Structure: At  = 1 every entrepreneur is privately informed about the produc-
tivity of her investment project. Since the issuer-entrepreneur knows the quality of the technology,
she knows the actual payo⁄/value of the bonds she issued. Thus entrepreneurs are privately in-
formed about the actual quality of the security they are selling. Consumers can only observe the
number of bonds that a ￿rm is issuing, not its technological quality.
Security Holdings and Prices: the speci￿c ￿nancial contract is identi￿ed observing the
number of bonds, (), issued by the ￿rm. Consumers observe the number of bonds a ￿rm issues
- which is public information - but not their qualities, which depends on the ￿rm￿ s technological
quality, the entrepreneur￿ s private information. Consumer  purchases () units of ￿nancial
contract  while entrepreneur  issues security  (or  when notation requires it) de￿ned by the
issuance of number  of bonds. () denotes the price of security of type "".8
Individual Budget Constraint  (())  (()): since the issue of bonds requires an
investment technology that can be o⁄ered as collateral, only entrepreneurs can issue securities.
Entrepreneur  budget constraint,  (()), is:

1 +  ￿ ()

2() ￿ ￿




Consumer  budget constraint,  (()), is:














Securities￿payo⁄depends on their actual value. Since consumers are all identical I assume, without
8Technically speaking, we should restrict  to a grid of ￿nite values to avoid measurability problems. In the
discussion that follows we will treat  as a continuous variable. We could always do so and then de￿ne the grid to
include the optimal  we derived. See Dubey et al. (2004) for a detailed discussion.
9loss of generality, they hold the same portfolio, i.e. the average one. The budget constraint is thus
standard in the interpretation.
2.1 De￿nition of the Equilibrium




















































0  = 
R 












;  = 2  2 fg
(Goods Market)
2.2 The Bond Market: Payments and Quantity
Each security is priced according to the expected payments/consumption it delivers. This expecta-
tion is a⁄ected in equilibrium by the presence of asymmetric information. The payment implications
of choosing how many bonds a ￿rm issues can be conveyed through Figure 2 below.
Given our assumptions and the fact that technology  is more productive than technology ,
the expected payment of their securities behave as shown in Figure 2 - for an arbitrary constant
price  - where 
 denotes the number of assets after which entrepreneur with technology  wishes



























3 The Economy with Symmetric Information
It is useful to establish the symmetric information benchmark of this economy, so that we can
precisely isolate what is the e⁄ect of private information on pricing, investment and liquidity.
3.1 The Equilibrium
In the symmetric information benchmark, when ￿rms borrow, bonds￿quality is ￿transparent￿(i.e.
anyone knows the actual worth of any bond traded in the market). Consumers/savers always know
the actual expected payment of the bond they are purchasing. Since agents are risk neutral, a







where () is indexed by both  and  since consumers can observe the quality of the issuing ￿rm.
Given our assumptions, access to the credit market is bene￿cial to entrepreneurs since it allows
them to undertake the investment opportunity.
9By the de￿nition of bonds 
 solves
￿(=)(1¬   )
 = 1.















, and market price, (). Since the focus here is to measure economy-wide
liquidity, I de￿ne the following:11
De￿nition 1 The Economy Liquidity Premium is de￿ned as:
 = () ¬ ()
i.e. as the di⁄erence between the expected rates of return of the security issued by entrepreneurs 







be the Bond Yield for security  issued by ￿rm , i.e. the ratio between the promised deliv-
ery/payment, 1, and its market price, ().














where  = (). Notice that function (7) is nothing else than the di⁄erence between investment
proceedings and payments to bondholders. It depends only on those states in which entrepreneur
 produces positive output. The isopro￿t curves corresponding to function (7) can be drawn as in

























(1 ¬   )

= 1
is, as before, the number of bonds after which entrepreneur  starts to default. There are two
observations to be made regarding the isopro￿t. First, perhaps not surprisingly, given security 
pro￿ts increase in (), the price paid by bondholders to entrepreneurs to purchase a bond. This
can be checked in Figure 3 by the fact that higher isopro￿ts in the diagram are also associated with
higher pro￿ts. Second, any isopro￿t is U-shaped if the ￿rm issues a number of bonds  ￿ 
, it is
kinked at  = 
 and decreasing after 
. The U-shape in the ￿rst part of the isopro￿t is the result
of the fact that the technology is strictly concave. At any given price, there is a unique optimal ￿
that maximizes pro￿t at that price. Whenever you move the leverage decision  of the ￿rm away
from ￿, the only way to keep pro￿ts at the same level is to increase the price. This can only be
done though up to 
 where the isopro￿t is kinked because this is the number of bonds at which
the entrepreneur is indi⁄erent between defaulting and paying back his creditor. For any   
,
the entrepreneur would rather default and keep share   of his production ￿ ( = ()). Since
 (()) is increasing in , the only way to keep pro￿t constant is by decreading the bond price:
thus the isopro￿t must be downward sloping in this region.
Entrepreneurs maximize expected pro￿ts ￿(). Exploiting (7) and taking the FOC with respect

































denotes the contingency/ies where ￿rm  does not default
and n denotes its complement. The interpretation is standard: securities are issued until the
level of investment, , equalizes the marginal bene￿t of investing - marginal productivity - to its
marginal cost. The marginal cost is the ratio between the payment to lenders in no default states,
X
2 ￿, and the bene￿t of issuing an additional bond, (), plus the e⁄ect that the marginal
bond has on the price of all infra-marginal bonds, 
()
 
Given the technological assumptions in (3), when security  ￿ 
 is chosen, entrepreneurs
endowed with better technology  never default while the ones with worse technology  default
with positive probability, i.e. f = g =  ￿ . A direct implication of our assumptions and
condition (8) are:
Proposition 3 In the equilibrium of the economy with symmetric information the level of invest-






Using condition (8), I can provide a simple graphical illustration of proposition 3 in Figure 4.
The pro￿t maximizing security is chosen so that isopro￿t and expected payments are tangent. By
no arbitrage condition, di⁄erent technologies must guarantee the same expected rate of return on























 is the security issued by entrepreneur 
and so all bond prices (￿
 ) correctly re￿ ect the fundamental value of each and every bond present






,while no adverse selection in investment takes place. I summarize the
main results by the following proposition given without proof:









2.  = 0, i.e. the expected rate of return is equalized across technologies;
3. bond yields decrease in the quality of technology:  (￿
)   (￿
).
4. the equilibrium is pareto optimal.
0
1



















4 The Economy with Asymmetric Information
In this case it is necessary to derive the equilibrium of the economy by backward induction. At
 = 2, production realizes, ￿nancial contracts are settled and bond payments made. At settlement
date, entrepreneurs either pay their contractual obligations, one unit of consumption per bond,
or they surrender share (1 ¬   ) of their production. Consumers holding bonds receive payments
corresponding to the quality and kind of securities they own. Everyone consumes his net wealth.
At  = 1 entrepreneurs raise funds through capital markets by issuing bonds. Private informa-
tion plays a crucial role:
Axiom 5 (Private Information) At  = 1 the entrepreneur issuing bonds is privately informed
about their actual payments.
Assumption (5) is a direct consequence of the assumption that entrepreneurs are privately
15informed about the quality of the investment technology they own. The buyer of a security can
only observe the number, , of bonds issued by a ￿rm - and so the security type - not their quality.
The bond market is thus segmented into speci￿c security market where all ￿rms issuing the same
number of bonds are traded. In each market, consumers form expectations about the value of the
average bond. This expectation is the crucial determinant of asset prices, (), and so security
prices are indexed by  only.
Entrepreneurs take into account the role of private information when they decide which se-
curity/how many bonds they issue. The central question becomes how much separation across
technologies, if any, will be present in equilibrium, i.e. whether the equilibrium in the security
space is going to be pooling or separating. I turn to this issue now.
4.1 Equilibrium Liquidity
4.1.1 Equilibrium Securities: the Basic Trade-O⁄
In equilibrium, each security is priced according to the expected consumption it delivers. Because
of asymmetric information, buyers do not know the actual delivery of the bond they are buying
and so they must form expectations about its average quality/payment. Since consumers maximize









Since buyers can only observe  the number of bonds a ￿rm issues, bond prices are indexed
by  only in asymmetric information economy. Equation (9) formalize rational expectations in this
framework: the equilibrium price must be equal to the expected delivery of the average bond traded
in the market for security . The average bond quality in turn depends on the relative shares of
good and bad entrepreneurs issuing a given security, i.e. undertaking the same leverage decision .
Since the ratio between good () and bad () entrepreneurs may change across di⁄erent se-
curities, there are incentives for entrepreneurs to distort their choices attempting to distinguish
from/mimic others through their leverage decisions. In general, the easier it is to reproduce the
behavior of the most productive entrepreneurs, the more depressed the market price, (), is and
16the higher the discount charged to bonds issued by entrepreneurs .
Productive entrepreneurs, anticipating this ￿shading￿ , may decide to distort their security
choice . This distortion implies a trade-o⁄ for entrepreneurs with bad technology : on the
one hand, they unambiguously bene￿t from a subsidized market price (a positive price e⁄ect) if
they mimic better quality entrepreneurs; on the other hand, they also have to mimic the distorted
security decision of entrepreneur  (a negative leverage e⁄ect).
The buyer of a bond thus may face a ￿Lemons market￿problem: he knows that entrepreneurs 
issue bonds with actual delivery below the market price, if they pool together with more productive
entrepreneurs. The equilibrium market price of all traded securities issued by both high and low
productivity entrepreneurs implicitly imposes a premium charged upon type  entrepreneurs. A
pooling equilibrium may nonetheless survive, even if the most productive entrepreneurs are paying
a premium - a liquidity premium- because the leverage/security choice distortion necessary for
entrepreneurs  to di⁄erentiate themselves may be too costly. Since all agents are risk neutral, the
liquidity premium resulting here is due only to asymmetric information. In the following sections I
will show that the kind of equilibrium appearing in the bond market closely depends on aggregate
conditions of the economy. But before doing so I need to discuss in details the relevant notion of
equilibrium for this set of economies.
4.1.2 Equilibrium Securities: O⁄-Equilibrium Pricing and Robustness of the Equi-
librium13
To characterize the equilibrium of this economy one needs to be careful in de￿ning pricing over all
securities/leverage levels . When we couple competitive markets and private information, rational
expectations alone provide no guidance in the determination of prices for securities that are not
actively issued and traded in equilibrium. This is important because, in order to choose the optimal
leverage, entrepreneurs must be able to compare prices for all possible securities they may issue.
This may lead to a paradox: every agent may expect the price of all o⁄-equilibrium securities to be
zero, simply because no one is trading them. But these "pessimistic" o⁄-equilibrium expectations
would make it possible to support almost any allocation as an equilibrium. In order to get around
13This subsection adresses few technical issues within the present context in the de￿nition of the equilibrium pricing
functional. The uninterested reader may skip to section 4.2 without impairing his understanding of the main results.
17this problem, I apply the methodology proposed by Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002) in the context
of the insurance model a la Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). They address this feature by imposing
a tremble ￿on the market￿ : they introduce an external agent of positive measure forced to issue
all securities, even the ones that would otherwise be absent, and this allows them to pin down
o⁄-equilibrium prices.
In this paper I introduce in the economy an external agent of measure  = fg￿J issuing every
o⁄-equilibirum security, say 0, as if he were an entrepreneur of type  endowed with the better





, if only the
external agent were to issue it. In this way the external agent allows to pin down security prices
for all securities. I denote the economy where the external agent is introduced as the "-economy".
In order to determine the equilibrium of the -economy, one has to check how entrepreneurs react
to the introduction of the external agent. In particular, we have to check whether entrepreneurs
￿nd it pro￿table to issue the same security that was part of the equilibrium we want to support
or some wish to deviate to another security, once the external agent is introduced. In practice I
am asking each agent whether an entrepreneur would "change his mind", once the external agent
enters the economy. Taking into account the optimizing behavior of all agents, one can, by rational
expectations, compute security prices in the given -economy - i.e. the equilibrium prices of the
economy, () 8, where the external agent is forced to issue all securities and entrepreneurs 
















[￿() + ] + ￿()
where ￿() labels the measure of -type entrepreneur issuing security  if the external agent has
measure . Thus the equilibrium of the -economy is de￿ned:
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(Goods Market)
To check whether an allocation is sustained as an equilibrium de￿ned in Section 2.1, one has to
control that it is the limit a sequence of -economies where the measure of the external agent goes
to zero, i.e. () ! 0 8 for  ¬! +1. If, as the external agent gets smaller and smaller, more
and more entrepreneurs leave o⁄-equilibrium securities and return back to issue the security/ies of
the equilibrium allocation one wants to support, we will say that the original security/ies is/are
an equilibrium surviving the ￿tremble￿ . This way of de￿ning the equilibrium is very close, mutatis
mutandis, to the notion of trembling-hand perfect equilibrium introduced by Selten (1975) and the
interested reader may refer to Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002) for a more thorough discussion.
What is important to point oout here is the fact that, in principle, the larger is the set of
expected payments of the external agent for which an equilibrium survives, the more robust thi0s
equilibrium is. For the sake of simplicity, we have explicitly considered only the external agent
most likely to break any equilibrium, i.e. the one behaving as a good quality entrepreneur. This
choice is due to the fact that, if an equilibrium survives this "optimistic" tremble, it survives any
other tremble where the external agent behaves as an entrepreneur of lower quality with positive
probability. In fact, if an entrepreneur does not change his equilibrium security under the prospects
of being pooled in a di⁄erente security with a very good external agent, he will certainly not leave
if he risks being pooled with an external agent of worse quality. This discussion can be formally
summarized through the following de￿nition:
De￿nition 7 An equilibrium is robust if it is the limit, for () ¬!
¬!+1
0 8, of a sequence of







Reinterpreting the notion of pool in Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002) as security here, I prove
that, di⁄erently from them, pooling equilibria are surprisingly robust to o⁄-equilibrium beliefs. In
19the following section I use a constructive approach to identify the conditions under which robust
pooling equilibria arise.
4.2 Liquidity Premium and the State of the Economy
4.2.1 Illiquid Pooling Equilibria
In an equilibrium where entrepreneurs endowed with di⁄erent technologies issue di⁄erent securities
, i.e. in a separating equilibrium, the expected rate of return on every and each bond is () = 1,
8  and the "economy liquidity premium" of de￿nition (1)  = 0 while bond yields diverge:
 ()   (). Instead, if in equilibrium all entrepreneurs issue the same security ￿, i.e. if
the equilibrium in the bond market is pooling, it must be that:




while bond yields of di⁄erent ￿rms coincide:
 (￿) =  (￿)
since all ￿rms issue bonds at the same price (￿). Therefore, I say the pooling equilibrium to be
illiquid while the separating equilibrium is de￿ned liquid. Analogously, while bond yields diverge
in the liquid separating equilibrium, they converge in the illiquid pooling equilibrium.
Because of rational expectations, equation (9) ensures that security prices re￿ ect the average
quality of bonds traded in the market for a single security . The better a technology is, the higher
is the expected interest rate it pays in a pooling equilibrium. Therefore, in equilibrium, good
technology entrepreneurs borrow at unfavorable terms and are adversely selected. Lack of liquidity
does not only refer to the fact that good investment opportunities face hard terms when applying
for credit but also to the fact that credit providers have a hard time in identifying the most worthy
projects and so part of the funds are diverted towards less productive investment.
Equation (8) states the reference criterion by which the entrepreneur chooses the optimal secu-
rity to issue. The reader is referred to equation (8) for the relevant interpretation. Here it su¢ ces
20to remind that entrepreneurs equalize the marginal bene￿t of investing and the marginal cost of
￿nancing. Since equation (8) is also relevant in the case of asymmetric information, it is convenient
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(11)
which gives the slope of the isopro￿t curve for entrepreneur . Given our technological assumption
(3) and pro￿t function (7), it is immediate to show that, for a given couple (()) of security type







if  ￿ 
 (12)
Given any pooling price (￿) one can compute the number of bonds, 
, after which low produc-
tivity ￿rms default. Inequality (12) implies that, for any security  ￿ 
 the price fall su¢ cient to
keep pro￿ts constant as the number of bonds decreases is greater for entrepreneurs endowed with
worse technology  (see Figure 5). This property is su¢ cient to deliver the following theorem:
Theorem 8 (Pooling Equilibrium in Slow Growth Economies) When the probability that
the good contingency ( = ) realizes is su¢ ciently small, 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
, there is a unique ro-
bust pooling equilibrium where both types of ￿rms issue security ￿ = 
 at price
(￿ = 
) = ￿() + (1 ¬ ￿())￿
These economies are illiquid since they display a positive liquidity premium
  0
and bond yields are equalized across di⁄erent ￿rms
 (￿) =  (￿)
Proof. Appendix.
The theorem above is central and it is important to provide an intuition for the reason why
the proposed setup delivers it. I refer the interested reader to the appendix for its formal proof.
In Figure 5 the two isopro￿ts (solid lines) for entrepreneurs  and  going through the pooling
21equilibrium (
(
)) are drawn, with the addition of a dashed line representing the isopro￿t of
entrepreneur  if she chose the pro￿t maximizing security at the "fair" price ￿. Entrepreneur 
wishes to di⁄erentiate himself to avoid subsidizing entrepreneurs . Attempting to do so, the most
pro￿t he can achieve is obtained by choosing security 
 where he commits to issue more bonds that
would be optimal for him to do at the given price (
).14 Figure 5 shows that this is the optimal
leverage decision of entrepreneurs : if they were to issue security,  6= 
, entailing a lower or
higher number of bonds, they would require a price strictly higher than the one su¢ cient to attract
entrepreneurs  (see inequality (12)). This means that more low quality entrepreneurs would issue
this new security and the price would go below what makes good entrepreneurs indi⁄erent with
issuing the original security,
.
Entrepreneurs  may ￿nd it pro￿table to mimic entrepreneurs , although this requires a
distortion in their issuance decision. Entrepreneurs  undertake the costly action of distorting
their security choice toward 
 only if this gives them higher pro￿ts than what they would earn if
they chose their security independently and were recognized by the market for what they are: low
productivity entrepreneurs issuing bonds with high probability of default. This can be illustrated
in ￿gure 5 where the isopro￿t tangent to the delivery of low quality entrepreneurs (the dashed line)
lies below the isopro￿t of entrepreneur  going through the pooling equilibrium.
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14Notice that it is irrelevant to choose security   
 for entrepreneurs  because pro￿ts ￿
(  
) = 0.
22The result may be simply stated: if the state of the economy is su¢ ciently bad, the probability
￿ that the good state of the economy realizes is su¢ ciently small. Then low productivity technolo-
gies are su¢ ciently di⁄erent from high productivity ones, and so low quality entrepreneurs gain
substantially by mimicking good quality entrepreneurs. This can be graphically shown through
Figure 5: the "height" of the dashed line depends on the probability of the good state, ￿. When-
ever the latter is small enough, the positive "price e⁄ect" enjoyed by entrepreneurs  pooling with
entrepreneurs  - the "subsidy" their bond price receives - dominates the negative "leverage e⁄ect"
they pay - the distortion in their leverage decision. The theorem above suggests that, although
good quality entrepreneurs try their best to di⁄erentiate themselves and signal the market their
quality, it is really the incentive of bad quality entrepreneurs to mimic them that plays the crucial
role.
The fact that a su¢ ciently small probability of the good state of the economy, ￿, delivers a
pooling equilibrium which is robust in the sense of de￿nition 7, i.e. robust to perturbations of any
mix of good and bad entrepreneurs15, is of interest in its own right. It is worthwhile to observe
that these equilibria are more likely to materialize the higher is the relative measure of productive
over unproductive entrepreneurs. The intuition behind the robustness of pooling equilibria in our
framework is grounded on one assumption only: good quality entrepreneurs may attempt to dis-
tinguish themselves by issuing more bonds and increasing their leverage to push bad entrepreneurs
into default, but, since their bonds deliver a higher payment, their total expected delivery increases
relatively faster than the one of bad quality securities as the number of bonds increases Therefore,
it is the realistic assumption that bond￿ s expected payments and the technology￿ s quality are posi-
tively correlated that turns out to be ultimately responsible for the robustness of the illiquid pooling
equilibrium. Stating that pooling equilibria are robust has important macroeconomic implications:
it supports the view that not only liquidity shortages may arise in the economy, but it states that
imperfect liquidity, generated by asymmetric information, is robust to the di⁄erent expectations
that entrepreneurs may form about the prices of o⁄-equilibrium securities.
Notice ￿nally that the level of investment is constant across technologies in the illiquid pooling
15This results complements Dubey and Geanakoplos (2003) where it is argued that, organizing security trade
through "pools", separating equilibria always exist and are the only ones robust to "optimistic" o⁄-equilibrium
expectations.
23equilibrium, although the rates of return at which good entrepreneurs borrow is larger than the
one at which bad entrepreneurs do (see inequality (10)). The di⁄erence between the terms of
borrowing between the two kinds of entrepreneurs, absent in the symmetric information benchmark,
is responsible for the instance of the adverse selection in investment we have here.
4.2.2 Liquid Separating Equilibria
Theorem 8 has an important corollary that concludes the study of the relationship between liquidity
and economic ￿ uctuations. I have already highlighted that, if the probability of the good state is
su¢ ciently low, the pooling equilibrium is the unique robust equilibrium. It is thus natural to ask
the question of what type of equilibrium emerges when the aggregate productivity in the economy
improves and the probability, ￿, of the good contingency, , increases. The answer to this question
is provided by the following corollary:
Corollary 9 (Separating Equilibrium in High Growth Economies) When the probability of
the good contingency is su¢ ciently large, ￿￿
  ￿ ￿ 1, the economy displays a separating equilib-
rium where di⁄erent kinds of ￿rms issue di⁄erent securities,  at prices
() = 1
() = ￿
These economies are liquid since they display no liquidity premium:
 = 0
and bond yields are di⁄erent:
 () = 1   ()
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In order to see that a liquid separating equilibrium emerges as the probability of the good state
being realized increases, it su¢ ces to argue at the upper bound of the probability distribution over
states of the world, i.e. when probability ￿ is equal to 1. In this case, for entrepreneur  the
"price e⁄ect" would be equal to zero while the "leverage e⁄ect" would still be negative. Thus there
would be no advantage for entrepreneurs  in distorting their leverage choice since they would
gain nothing by doing so. A separating equilibrium would naturally arise. But then, arguing by
continuity, a separating equilibrium would survive even if the probability of the good state, ￿, is
lowered by an arbitrary small amount. Thus there is a continuum of values of ￿  1 so that the
liquid separating equilibrium emerges.
The intuition is that, as ￿ increases, the two technologies become more and more similar.
Eventually, entrepreneurs  prefer to leave the pooling equilibrium, be priced for what they are
and avoid the leverage distortion. This equilibrium is incentive compatible when, as illustrated by
Figure 6, the security choice of entrepreneurs  , and the choice of entrepreneurs   lie on
the same isopro￿t of low quality entrepreneur .
In conclusion, it is important to point out that in these economies the increase in liquidity
as the state of the economy improves is due to the change in the equilibrium security and not to
the increase in the average quality of the traded ones, as in Eisfeldt (2004). In the perspective
25of this paper, it is the optimazing behavior of entrepreneurs while they choose their leverage that
plays a central role in establishing the relationship between the liquidity of the economy and its
￿ uctuations. This dynamic also delivers that the level of aggregate investment is higher when the
level of aggregate productivity is higher, i.e. ￿ ¬! 1.
5 Liquidity and Economic Fluctuations: Evidence in the United
States
This paper mainly contributes to the developing line of research in macroeconomics aimed at
characterizing and explaining the relationship between economic ￿ uctuations and the liquidity of
the economy.16 Policy analysts seem to agree that market liquidity tends to covary positively
with economic growth, even though liquidity is measured di⁄erently.17 The main contribution of
this paper has been to introduce a measure of liquidity that is theoretically sound, empirically
identi￿able and whose empirical behavior is consistent with the predictions of the model.
The main implications of our theory, summarized by Theorem 8 and its corollary is that the
proposed measure of liquidity - cross-￿rm dispersion of newly issued bond yields - should anticipate
improvements in aggregate economic performance. Liquidity increases when the economic prospects
improve: higher expected growth - captured in the model by increases in ￿ - determines a shift
from pooling to separating equilibria, it increases the cross-￿rm dispersion of bond yields issued in
any given quarter and, thus, liquidity. We now turn to the US corporate debt market to provide
empirical evidence in support of these theoretical predictions.
In any given quarter in the United States, ￿rms issue a wide array of securities. The vast
majority is publicly traded corporate debt, which is the focus of this paper.18 We collected ￿rm
level data through SDC Platinum about all issuances of publicly traded, non convertible, private
corporate debt in the United States in the period 1970-2005. Eventually, attention was restricted
only to those issues by non ￿nancial ￿rms where yield, maturity and Moody￿ s rating data were
16Eisfeldt (2004), Rampini (2003), Rampini and Eisfeldt (2006), Kurlat (2009).
17Measures of liquidity di⁄er on the basis of the macroeconomic or ￿nancial focus of the study. In macroeconomics
it is typically identi￿ed with how accessible credit is, in ￿nance by bid-ask spread, turnover,or market depth.
18See Bolton and Scharfstein (1996).
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Non Convertible, Publicly Traded, Corporate Debt, 1970q1-2005q4
Bond Issuances % (of Total)
Total 20,122










Financial Firms 4,931 25%
Firms with NA sector 5,058 25%
Data Source:  
Table1
Let us start with considering the liquidity available to non ￿nancial ￿rms. Consistently with our
model, we empirically measure liquidity in quarter  by the cross-￿rm coe¢ cient of variation (CV)
of yields of the newly issued bonds in the given quarter. The economy-wide liquidity premium of
de￿nition 1 is negatively correlated with the dispersion of bond yields. This means that the larger
is the dispersion, the lower is the liquidity premium and the higher thus is liquidity. Figure 7
shows the behavior of liquidity over time. The evidence displayed in this Figure shows that, in the
US, (1) the overall level of liquidity has (slightly) increased during the period 1970-2005 and (2)
liquidity tends to fall in correspondence of (NBER-dated) economic contractions.20 In particular,
liquidity seems to be a leading variable of the business cycle: typically, it falls in anticipation of a
contraction, especially during its ￿rst half, while it starts improving towards its end in anticipation
19We focus on non ￿nancial ￿rms because ￿nancial ￿rms issue bonds for a variety of reasons related to ￿nancial
intermediation and not the undertaking of investment analyzed by our model. Moreover, we adopt the convention
that, whenever a company issued more than one type of debt in a given quarter, our dataset imputed only one issue
to this company with maturity, ratings and yield equal to the average of the observed issues.
20The level of liquidity is higher (below the 1% level of statistical signi￿cance) during expansions than during
contractions.













We take the analysis of the empirical evidence one step further by testing whether the level of
liquidity within manufacturing ￿rms only is correlated in a statistically signi￿cant way with im-
provements in economic activity, proxied by 1-year ahead changes in industrial production. Figure
8 depicts the behavior of the two time series in the manufacturing sector. Table 2 shows the results
of the following simple-minded regression that includes the cross-￿rm bond dispersion of maturity
and ratings:
 = ￿0 + ￿1 ￿ +4 + ￿2 ￿ () + ￿3 ￿  () + 
 ￿ (0￿2)
(13)
where  is the cross-￿rm coe¢ cient of variation of yields in bonds issued in quarter ,
+4 is the (moving average over quarters  + 1- + 4) change in industrial production over the
previous quarter in quarter +4, () and () are, respectively, the cross-￿rm
CV of maturities and Moody￿ s ratings of newly issued bonds in quarter .21
21We chose Moody￿ s ratings because they allowed us to include a larger number of bond issuances in our sample.
28Dep. Variable OLS Post 1st Oil Shock Post 2nd Oil Shock
 1970-2005 1975:3-2005 1983:2-2005
+4 0.012** 0.015** 0.016*
(0003) (0005) (0007)
() 0.228** 0.213** 0.08
(002) (0003) (0007)
 () 0.051 0.04 0.027
(0048) (0053) (0068)
￿0 -0.031 -0.017 0.083
(0031) (0039) (0051)
Observations 144 122 91
R-squared 0.41 0.28 0.06
SE in parentheses ** signi￿cant at 1% * signi￿cant at 5%
Table 2
Table 2 shows the results of regression (13). This speci￿cation is only capturing the positive
correlation between liquidity and subsequent economic activity, taking into account the fact that the
amount of cross-￿rm dispersion in bond yields may also depend on the public information available
at the time of issuance, such as maturity and Moody￿ s rating of issued bonds. The evidence
supports the view that the measure of liquidity we propose tends to anticipate improvements in
the subsequent (1 year ahead) level of economic activity. This relationship remains statistically
signi￿cant, controlling for the public information available at the time of issuance, and robustly
survives in di⁄erent time intervals.
The provision of a theoretical explanation linking the future level of economic activity and the
dispersion in bonds￿yields is, to my knowledge, novel and interesting in its own right. The adopted
approach focuses on an additional reason - asymmetric information - to rationalize why di⁄erent
bonds pay di⁄erent yields even if they are issue at the same time. This focus allows to highlight a
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Figure 8
Here I want to stress that, by identifying the cross-￿rm dispersion in bond yields as a measure of
the liquidity of the economy, the provided framework shows how the lack of economy-wide liquidity
translates into bonds mispricing, yields concentration and investment misallocation. According to
this perspective, it is in anticipation of future adverse economic conditions that good entrepreneurs
end up paying disproportionately high interest rates to undertake their investment.
6 Concluding Remarks
The main purpose of this work is to propose a theoretical answer to the question of what determines
the economy-wide level of liquidity and how we could think about the relationship between liquidity
and economic activity. This has been done in a context where ￿rms￿leverage is the result of
the optimizing behavior by entrepreneurs facing asymmetric information. Under this perspective,
the optimal leverage decision drives the relationship between liquidity and the macroeconomy.
30We provide a general equilibrium illustration of how the liquidity of the economy can depend
on constant informational asymmetry concerning the value of its investment opportunities. The
informational asymmetry is responsible of the illiquidity of the economy because it may generate
a discrepancy between current market prices and the actual discounted value of bonds issued to
￿nance investment. Then I relate this discrepancy to the suitability of bonds in ￿nancing private
investment. In this way the equilibrium level of liquidity becomes a crucial factor in the allocation
of credit, and thus private investment.
The analysis yields the following main implications. First, it shows that illiquidity is an equi-
librium phenomenon, likely to appear in economies with poor economic prospects. Firms take into
account the state of the economy when they decide how many bonds they issue, how often these
bonds default and how serious the default is. This study shows that ￿rms tend to undertake similar
leverage decisions, when economic growth slows down. The positive correlation between payments
to bondholders, given leverage, and the underlying technological quality is ultimately responsible
for the appearance of robust pooling equilibria. This is not only interesting in its own right, but
also because it implies that illiquidity is likely to be a persistent equilibrium outcome.
Second, I relate the theoretical model to an empirical regularity of the US corporate debt
market that, to my knowledge, I am the ￿rst to highlight: the positive correlation between cross-
￿rm dispersion in bond yields and subsequent economic activity. I provide an explanation for this
empirical regularity which is rooted in the e⁄ect of asymmetric information on the entrepreneurial
optimization problem. This argument is based on the realistic and standard assumption that ￿rms
leverage is observable by savers. It is the entrepreneur￿ s choice about how many bonds he issues
and the resulting leverage to be ultimately responsible for the level of liquidity of the economy.
It is, to my knowledge, the ￿rst theoretical explanation that identi￿es bond yields variance as an
empirically useful measure of liquidity and relates it to aggregate economic activity.
Although our technology is neoclassical, the reader may argue that our analysis is based on
some restrictive assumptions: let me address this possible concern here. First, the only feature we
require for the pooling equilibrium to arise is that the dimension of separation - the leverage choice
- must be relatively more expensive for entrepreneurs endowed with the better technology. This
is guaranteed whenever better entrepreneurs issue bonds that, ceteris paribus, default less often.
31And this also seems realistic to assume.
Second, one could argue that there is really no need for the economy to move from pooling to
separating equilibria in order to provide a theory of procyclical liquidity. The fact that default rates
are typically countercyclical would naturally bring together rates of return in good times and vice
versa. This is certainly true, but such a perspective, where only pooling equilibria exists, would
have a hard time in explaining why bond yields - not returns - across di⁄erent ￿rms tend to be
closer in bad times than in good times, which is the stylized fact we highlight here.
Third, although we do not allow entrepreneurs to invest internal funds - in fact they have
none here, this assumption would not change my results. As Martin (2009) shows, the possibility
of good entrepreneurs to invest their own funds or pledge private funds as collateral, allows for
pooling equilibria in a general equilibrium setting where lending is channeled through securities
and banks.
Fourth, it is important for our main result that, in the event of default, creditors can not
seize the entire value of production. This seems a realistic assumption that may be justi￿ed with
standard arguments - e.g. inappropriability of entrepreneurs￿human capital, costly post default
screening.
It is probably fruitful to search for a framework that, starting from the macroeconomy, provides
asset pricing implications that can help to grasp a better understanding of the liquidity of the
economy. We remain in need of a general benchmark, along the lines of Holmstrom and Tirole
(1998) and Hellwig and Lorenzoni (2009), to analyze the role of government bonds and many
￿nancial arrangements available in reality in determining economy-wide liquidity.
References
[1] G. Akerlof, The Market for ￿ Lemons￿ : Qualitative Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 89, 488-500, (1970)
[2] K. J. Arrow, The Role of Securities in the Optimal Allocation of Risk-bearing, The Review of
Economic Studies, Vol. 31, No. 2. (1964)
32[3] P. Bolton and D. S. Scharfstein, Optimal Debt Structure and the Number of Creditors, The
Journal of Political Economy, 104, 1-25 (1996)
[4] R. Caballero and A. Krishnamurthy, International and Domestic Collateral Constraints in
a Model of Emerging Market Crises, Journal of Monetary Economics, Vol. 48, 513￿ 548,
(2001)
[5] R. Caballero and A. Krishnamurthy, A Dual Liquidity Model for Emerging Markets, American
Economic Review Papers and Proccedings, Vol.92, No. 2, 33-37, (2002)
[6] D. Diamond and P. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and Liquidity, Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 91, No. 3, 401-419, (1983).
[7] D. Diamond and R. Rajan, Bank Bailouts and Aggregate Liquidity, American Economic Re-
view Papers and Proceedings, Vol. 92, No. 2, 38-41, (2002)
[8] P. DeMarzo and D. Du¢ e, A Liquidity-Based Model of Security Design, Econometrica, Vol.
67, No. 1, 65-99, (1999)
[9] P. DeMarzo, The Pooling and Tranching of Securities: A model of Informed Intermediation,
Working Paper, (2003)
[10] P. Dubey and J. Geanakoplos, Competitive Pooling: Rotschild-Stiglitz Reconsidered, The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 117, No. 4, 1529-1570, (2002)
[11] A. Eisfeldt, Endogenous Liquidity in Asset Markets, Journal of Finance, Vol 54, No.1, 1-30,
(2004)
[12] A. Eisfeldt and A. Rampini, Capital Reallocation and Liquidity, Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, Vol. 53, No. 3, 369-399, (2006)
[13] E. Farhi, M. Golosov, and A. Tsyvinski, A Theory of Liquidity and Regulation of Financial
Intermediation, Working Paper, (2008)
[14] J. Geanakoplos, Liquidity, Default and Crashes: Endogenous contracts in general Equilibrium,
Advances in Economics and Econometrics: Theory and Applications, 8th World Confer-
ence, Vol. 2, 170￿ 205, (2003)
[15] G. Gorton and L. Huang, Liquidity, E¢ ciency and Bank Bailouts, American Economic Re-
view,Vol. 94, No. 3, 455-483, (2004)
33[16] B. Holmstrom and J. Tirole, LAPM: A liquidity-Based Asset Pricing Model, Journal of Fi-
nance, Vol. 56, 1837-1867 (2001)
[17] B. Holmstrom and J. Tirole, Private and Public Supply of Liquidity, Journal of Political
Economy, Vol. 106, No. 1, 1-40, (1998)
[18] M. Huang, Liquidity shocks and equilibrium liquidity premia, Journal of Economic Theory,
Vol. 109, 104-129, (2003)
[19] G. Huberman and D. Halka, Systematic liquidity, The Journal of Financial Research, Vol. 24,
161-178, (2001)
[20] C. Hellwig and G. Lorenzoni, Bubbles and Self-enforcing Debt, Econometrica, Vol. 77, No. 4,
1137-1164, (2009)
[21] T. Johnson, Dynamic Liquidity in Endowment Economies, Working Paper, (2004)
[22] F. Kydland and E. Prescott, Time to Build and Aggregate Fluctuations, Econometrica, Vol.
50, 1345-70, (1982)
[23] N. Kiyotaki and J. Moore, Credit Cycles, The Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 105, No 2,
211-48, (1997)
[24] N. Kiyotaki and J. Moore, Liquidity and Asset Prices, LSE Working Paper, (2001)
[25] N. Kiyotaki and J. Moore, Liquidity, Business Cycle and Monetary Policy, LSE Working Paper,
(2001)
[26] A. Krishnamurthy, Collateral Constraints and the Ampli￿cation Mechanism, Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, Vol. 111, 277-292, (2003)
[27] P. Kurlat, Lemons, Market Shutdowns and Learning, MIT Mimeo, (2009)
[28] H. Leland and D. Pyle, Information Asymmetries, Financial Structure and Financial Interme-
diaries, Journal of Finance, Vol. 32, 371-387 (1977)
[29] A. Martin, On Rothschild Stiglitz as Competitive Pooling, Economic Theory, Vol. 31, Number
2, 683-694, (2007)
[30] A. Martin, Endogenous Credit Cycles, Journal of Economic Theory, Vol. 144, Number 4,
1572-1588, (2009)
34[31] S. Myers and N. Majluf, Corporate Financing and Investment when Firms Have Information
Shareholders Do Not Have, Journal of Financial Economics, Vol. 13, 197-221, (1984)
[32] S. Morris and H. Shin, Liquidity Black Holes, Review of Finance, Vol. 8, 2004, 1-18, (2003)
[33] A. Rampini and A. Eisfeldt, Capital Reallocation and Liquidity, Journal of Monetary Eco-
nomics, Vol. 53, 369-399, (2004)
[34] S. Ross, Options and E¢ ciency, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 90, No. 1, (1976)
[35] M. Rothschild and J. Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurane Markets: an Essay on the
Economics of Imperfect Information, The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 90, No. 4,
620-649, (1976)
[36] R. Selten, Reexamination of the Perfect Concept for Equilibrium Points in Extensive Games,
International Journal of Game Theory, Vol. 4 25-55
[37] J. Stiglitz and A. Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, The Amer-
ican Economic Review, Vol. 71, No. 3, 393-410, (1981)
[38] F. Taddei, Liquidity and the Allocation of Credit: Business Cycle, Government Debt and
Financial Arrangements, Working Paper, (2006)
7 Appendix
7.1 Entrepreneur￿ s Pro￿t Maximization





























denotes the contingency/ies where ￿rm  does not default.
Equilibrium investment is:
 = ()

























































































 if   

Proof of Proposition 3. Without loss of generality attention can be restricted to securities
 ￿ 










 = 0 if  ￿ 








































and   .
Proof of Theorem 8. In order to prove the existence of a pooling equilibrium we must ensure
that, at the equilibrium, the relevant local and global incentive compatibility constraints are sat-
is￿ed for both kinds of entrepreneurs. We prove that the number of bonds ￿ = 
 is the pooling
36equilibrium of the economy where both kinds of ￿rms issue the same security at price (￿) which
- by rational expectations - is equal to:(
)
(￿ = 
) = ￿() + (1 ¬ ￿())￿
First, consider that the pooling equilibrium is locally incentive compatible for both types of entre-
preneurs. In order to prove so, one may study the isopro￿t curve, the locus combining  and ()






if  ￿ 

Therefore we can use Figure 5 to check that 
(
) is indeed the pooling equilibrium we are
looking for. All we need to ensure is that I am supporting a pooling equilibrium is that there no
deviations that are pro￿table to entrepreneurs  without being so for entrepreneurs . First notice
that there no deviation with this property for security   
 or   
. In fact, any price for
security   
 or   
 that is above the isopro￿t of entrepreneurs  going through the pooling
equilibrium is also above the isopro￿t of entrepreneurs  Therefore, there is no deviation that can
attract entrepreneurs of good quality only. All that remain to check is that entrepreneurs  would






























which is satis￿ed for ￿ = 0 Thus by continuity, we can argue that there is ￿￿
 such that for
￿  ￿￿
 the pooling is supported as an incentive compatible equilibrium.
I conclude the proof by showing that the pooling equilibrium is robust in the sense that it
survives the perturbation where the external agent () behaves as high quality () entrepreneurs
37on o⁄-equilibrium securities. The crucial condition for the equilibrium to survive is that the price
that makes high productivity entrepreneurs indi⁄erent to the pooling, () is larger than the
price that makes low productivity entrepreneurs indi⁄erent, (). I will present the argument
concisely since the structure is very similar to Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002):
Lemma 10 When 0 ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿￿
, the pooling equilibrium ￿ = 
 is robust in the sense of de￿nition
7.
Proof. Pick the pooling equilibrium and consider the only active security ￿ = 
. By equation
(9), given the proportions of good and bad quality entrepreneurs ￿() and ￿(), 
￿ s price is
determined by the delivery vectors 

(),  = . Now focus on o⁄-equilibrium securities,
 6= 
:
1. consider an external agent entirely characterized by her delivery vector which I assume iden-
tical to 
 (), the delivery vector of good quality entrepreneurs;
2. for each security  6= 
, let () be a positive mass of external agent issuing securities in
market . Given the exogenous mass () ￿nd the equilibrium of the -economy as de￿ned
in (6) allowing all agents to reoptimize;
3. ￿nally take () ¬!
¬!+1
0, i.e. the measure of the external agent to zero. The limit of the
sequence, (1) = 0, replicates the original economy. If the equilibrium of the () economy
converges to the pooling equilibrium ￿ = 
 of the original economy, then we say that the
equilibrium survives the external agent "perturbation". If the equilibrium survives this per-
turbation is robust. Any robust equilibrium survives perturbations de￿ned for delivery rates
smaller or equal to the one considered here. Thus the equilibrium survives the perturbation
in which the external agent is characterized by any delivery vector between 
 () and 
 ().
In order to prove the lemma it su¢ ces to show that in the () economy entrepreneurs with
low quality technology () are at least indi⁄erent between issuing ￿ = 
 and  6= 
 while
entrepreneurs with high quality technology () are at most indi⁄erent, if not worse o⁄. This
is equivalent to ￿nding that the price that makes "" entrepreneurs indi⁄erent to the pooling
38equilibrium security makes "" entrepreneurs willing to stick to the pooling, i.e. ()  ().
To this purpose consider the choice of the entrepreneur who is issuing ￿ = 
 and is now facing
the introduced perturbation on security  6= 
 in the () economy.
This su¢ ces to support the pooling equilibrium ￿ = 
. This implies that, at the equilibrium
prices of the -economy, low quality technology holders () are (weakly) better o⁄ issuing security
 6= 
 while high quality technology holders are strictly worse o⁄ by doing so. But this means
that, the pooling equilibrium 
 survives the perturbation consisting of an external agent behaving
as if he were a good quality entrepreneur on o⁄-equilibrium securities.
Since the deviations of low quality entrepreneurs is triggered by the external agent of measure
() to issue  6= 
 = ￿, the measure of entrepreneurs  issuing securities di⁄erent from ￿ = 

converges to zero as () ! 0.
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